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ADDITIONAL STATE INHERITANCE TAXATION TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF CREDIT
ALLOWANCE ON FEDERAL TAX
THE objection that federal estate taxation is an encroachment upon state control
over the devolution of property 1 led Congress, in 1924, to provide that decedents'
estates should be allowed a credit up to twenty-five per cent of their federal tax
for any transfer or succession tax actually paid to a state.2 This credit allowance
proved insufficient to meet the objections of the state taxing authorities. 3 Congress,
therefore, in 1926 increased the maximum credit allowance to eighty per cent of
the total federal tax,4 with the proviso, however, that an estate should be entitled
to the credit only for state taxes paid within three years r of the filing of the federal
tax return. Since under this provision a state, merely by imposing a sufficiently high
tax, may receive a tax which the estate would otherwise be required to pay to the
federal government, the state legislatures have sought ways and means of taking
advantage of the credit allowance. Some states merely increased their existing
inheritance taxes. 6 But Pennsylvania,7 in common with a number of other states,
8
added to its "normal" inheritance tax a new and "additional" tax, to be imposed
only when the "normal" tax does not equal eighty per cent of the federal tax or is
not paid within the three years allowed by Congress; 9 the "additional" tax in
each case is made to equal the amount by which the credit allowance exceeds the
1. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COm3TTEE ON INHE=ITANCE TAXATION (1925) 11.
2. 43 STAT. 304 (1924), upheld in Rouse v. United States, 65 Ct. Cl. 749 (1928).
3. DOUBLE TAXATION-PRELnnNARY REPORT OF A SUBCOM=rTTEE OF THE HOUSE CoM-
ITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933) 164; Brady, Statutory Solutions
of Multiple Death Taxation (1927)) 13 A. B. A. J. 147, 149.
4. 44 STAT. 70 (1926), 26 U. S. C. § 1093 (1926).
5. The four-year period allowed by the 1932 amendment apparently applies only to
the 1932 additional federal tax. 47 STAT. 278 (1932), 26 U. S. C. Sup. VI § 413 (b)
(1932).
6. For example, see N. J. Comp. STAT. (Supp. 1930) § 208-537. For a report of the
taxes used by the different states see DOUBLE TAXATIoN-PRELimm-TARY REPORT, supra note
3, at 123.
7. PA. STAT. Awm. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 72, § 2303.
8. CoNN. GEN. AcTs (1931) § 248; FA. ComsP. LAWS (Supp. 1932) § 1342 (2); Ind.
Stat. 1931, c. 75, § 38; ME. REv. STAT. (1930) c. 77, § 27, upheld in In re Opinion of the
Justices, 137 Atl. 50 (Me. 1927); MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, Supp. 1929) art. 62A, § 2;
Mass. Acts 1932, c. 284; MmiN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1931) § 2321-1; N. Y. Laws 1932,
c. 322; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1933) § 7880 (6), upheld in Hagood v. Doughton,
195 N. C. 811, 143 S. E. 841 (1928); Omo GEzr. CODE (Page, Supp. 1931) § 5335-1; cf.
Morsman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13 B. T. A. 415 (1928), 14 B. T. A. 108
(1928); Morton v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 23 B. T. A. 236 (1931); Smith v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 23 B. T. A. 278 (1931); Cross v. Downes, 164 AtI. 758
(Md. 1933).
9. While the Pennsylvania statute does not in terms impose the "additional" tax
when the "normal" tax is not paid within the three-year period, it apparently does so by
implication.
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amount of the "normal" tax immediately due. Although the Pennsylvania "normal"
tax is levied upon the privilege of succeeding to the property and so must be paid
by the donee,' 0 the federal tax and the "additional" state tax are payable from the
corpus of the estate."
In In re Crane's Estate12 the deceased gave a large amount of property to trustees
to pay the income to certain life tenants and at their deaths to deliver the property
to remaindermen. The Pennsylvania "normal" tax assessed against these donees did
not become due immediately, but could be paid by the life tenants from their income
as received and by the remaindermen when they acquired possession of the prop-
erty.13 On the other hand, the statute permitted the donees to pay these taxes
immediately. If the "normal" taxes were thus paid promptly they would take the
place of a large part of the assessment which the estate would otherwise pay either
to the federal government or, under the Pennsylvania "additional" tax, to the state;
but if the "normal" taxes were not paid within the three-year period, the estate
would be required to pay the full amount of the federal tax, eighty per cent thereof
going to the state, and the donees would still be liable for the "normal" tax upon
their gifts when received. To avoid this double taxation the executor paid both the
life tenants' and the remaindermen's "normal" taxes from the corpus of the estate.
Thereafter the remaindermen brought suit to compel the life tenants to reimburse
the estate for the payment of their "normal" tax. The court refused to require
such contribution from the life tenants, declaring that while the life tenants were
prejudiced by the loss of income upon the amount of the remaindermen's "normal"
tax and the remaindermen by the depletion of the corpus from payment of the life
tenants' "normal" tax, each of the donees had benefited by his release from future
liability for his own tax.14
The court apparently proceeded upon the theory that the executor's payment of
the donees' "normal taxes" reduced the corpus of the estate. But if the "normal"
taxes had not been paid promptly, an equal amount would have been assessed against
the estate as an "additional" tax or else the full federal tax would have been owed
to the federal government. The executor thus paid the "normal" taxes not in addi-
tion to but, pro tanto, instead of the taxes levied against the estate. Therefore no
depletion of the corpus resulted. In these circumstances the remaindermen suffered
no detriment from the executor's payment, and their demand for contribution from
the life tenants was properly refused.
It seems possible, however, that the state might raise some question with regard
to the payment by the executor of the life tenants' "normal" tax and also as to his
payment of that of the remaindermen. The "normal" tax is an obligation of the
donees, not of the estate. The tax paid by the executor from the corpus of the
estate resembled more the "additional" state transfer tax than it did the "normal"
tax. If upon this theory the state were to contend that the executor had actually
paid the "additional" tax and that the donees were still liable for their "normal"
taxes, the donees could apparently defend only upon the assertion of their own inter-
10. Penn-Gaskell's Estate, 208 Pa. 342, 57 Atl. 714 (1904) ; see also In re Hale's Estate,
18 P. (2d) 808 (Ore. 1933).
11. Newton's Estate, 74 Pa. Super. Ct. 361 (1920); In re Knowle's Estate, 299 Pa.
571, 145 AtI. 797 (1929).
12. 165 Ad. 858 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1933).
13. PA. STAT. Am. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 72, § 2304. See HANDY, TH=AXACE AND OM
LixE TAxxs (1929) § 338.
14. The court, quoting the lower court, also said that if the remaindermen's contention
were upheld, the estate would be liable for a further "additional" state tax. It would
be difficult to reconcile this statement with the latiguage of the statutes.
1933] NOTES
YALE LAW JOURNAL
pretation of the executor's payment. This possible continued liability to the state
would be avoided if not only the life tenants but also the remaindermen were to
reimburse the estate for their respective "normal" taxes. The life tenants would
in such a case lose the corpus value of their own "normal" tax; but they would
receive the income upon this amount for their own lives, and would also receive the
income from the amount of the remaindermen's "normal" tax during the same period.
The remaindermen, on the other hand, would lose the income from the amount of
their own "normal" tax during the lives of the life tenants, but thereafter would
profit by the addition to the corpus of the life tenants' tax. If calculation of values
based upon expectancies be considered sufficiently reliable for this purpose, what
the life tenants lose and the remaindermen gain in corpus value by the life tenants'
contribution of their "normal" tax will equal what the life tenants gain and the
remaindermen lose in income from the tax contribution by the remaindermen.15 It
would seem, therefore, that compelling reimbursement of the estate by both life
tenants and remaindermen would not merely preclude the possibility of a subse-
quent levy for "normal" taxes, but would, theoretically at least,16 cause no financial
damage to any of the parties.
REDUCTION OF INSURER'S LIABILITY BY PREFERENTIAL SETTLEMENTS
IN MULTIPLE CLAIM CASES
IN the recent case of Bartlett v. Travelers' Insurance Company,' the defendant,
representing its insured under a liability insurance policy which obligated it, in the
event of loss, to "serve the assured by such negotiation and such settlement of
any resulting claims as may be deemed expedient by the company," attempted the
settlement of three claims arising out of an automobile accident. There was slight
possibility of compromise of all claims within the limits of the policy. The de-
fendant settled and paid two of the claims in the belief that the plaintiff, the third
claimant, would compromise for an amount within the remaining coverage of the
policy. The plaintiff, however, refused to make such a compromise; instead, he
15. In determining such a result, the proportionate present values of the life estates
and the remainders should be ascertained. The "normal" tax payable presently by the
life tenants and the remaindermen would indicate that proportion, since the tax rate
in the principal case was the same on both life estate and the remainders (ten per cent
on gifts to collaterals, all the life tenants and remaindermen being collaterals). If the
value of the life estates were twice that of the remainders, then the life tenants would
have to contribute to the estate a sum (to meet the normal tax) twice that contributed
by the remaindermen. But the present value of the life tenants' interest in the sum of the
contributions would be twice the value of the remaindermen's interest. If the life tenants
in such a case contribute $1000 and the remaindermen $500, an addition to the principal
of the estate of $1500 would result; the present value of the interests of the life tenants
in such additional sum would be $1000 and the present value of the interests of the
remaindermen would be $500. The sum which the life tenants would lose and the
remaindermen gain in contribution to corpus is therefore the same as that which the life
tenants would gain and the remaindermen lose in contribution to income. The actual
proportion in value in the principal case (taken from the taxes assessed) was $99,791.12
(life estates): $79,518.25 (remainders). The illustration herein is expressed in terms of
a two-to-one proportion for the sake of simplicity.
16. It should of course be recognized that the correspondence between expectancy
tables and the actuality of specific cases is speculative.
1. 167 Atl. 180 (Conn. 1933).
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brought suit against the insured and recovered a judgment for a sum equal to the
full coverage of the policy. This judgment the insured could not pay. The plain-
tiff then sued the insurance company, contending that under the terms of the
policy the company's settlement of unlitigated claims did not reduce its liability
to a judgment creditor. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, rejecting
this contention, held the company liable only for the amount still unpaid on the
policy.
In the absence of statute, an injured person acquires no rights under a policy
insuring the tort-feasor, unless the policy expressly or impliedly gives him sdme
right.2 Such policies usually obligate the company only to indemnify the insured
for his payments to the injured party; they do not create a direct liability to the
claimant. 3 Modem statutes, however, require the insurer to assume liability also
to claimants holding judgments against the insured which the latter has not satis-
fied.4 It was apparently the theory of the plaintiff in the principal case that since
the policy did not expressly impose upon the insurance company liability to non-
judgment claimants, the company's payments to such claimants were gratuitous and
did not reduce its contractual liability to the insured and to the plaintiff as a judg-
ment creditor of the insured. While it is true that the policy failed to provide
expressly that the company's settlement of unlitigated claims should be counted
in diminution of its liability upon the policy, such a provision may reasonably be
implied from the clause authorizing the company to negotiate the settlements. The
right of the insurance company to a reduction of its liability may also be established
upon another ground. Since in negotiating settlements under a policy such as the
one in the instant case an insurer acts as agent for the insured,5 the company's
compromise agreements are binding upon the insured as principal. The company's
payments under these agreements may therefore be regarded as payments by the
insured. Had the insured actually paid the claimants himself, the company would
have been obligated to reimburse him, and for such reimbursement would have been
entitled by the terms of the policy to a reduction in its liability. The company's
adoption of the obvious short-cut in paying the claimants directly should not deprive
it of that right.
2. Shea v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 98 Conn. 447, 120 Atl. 286 (1923);
see Note (1924) 24 CoL. L. Rxv. 173; VAxcE, INSURAxcE (2d ed. 1930) 682.
3. Shea v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., supra note 2; VA ca, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 682, 685 n. 99. But cf. Patterson v. Adan, 119 Minn. 308, 138 N. W. 281 (1912) ;
Brucker v. Georgia Casualty Co., 326 Mo. 856, 32 S. W. (2d) 1088 (1930); American
Indemnity Co. v. Fellbaum, 114 Tex. 127, 263 S. W. 908 (1924), all indicating the equities
in favor of a more liberal rule.
4. The statutes in some states provide that in the event of the insolvency or bank-
ruptcy of the insured the company shall become liable to the injured person holding
an unsatisfied judgment against the insured. N. Y. I-1suRAcEc LAw (McKinney Supp.
1933) § 109; Wis. STAT. (1931) § 20430; see VAswcE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 687, n. 5. In
other states the statutes declare that the liability of the insurer to a judgment claimant
shall not depend upon satisfaction of the judgment by the insured. The Connecticut
statute is of the latter type. CoxN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 4231. As a result of these stat-
utes, liability insurance has come to be regarded as a means of compensation for injured
persons, rather than as primarily a protection to the insured. Comment (1933) 42 YALE
L. J. 1103, 1105.
5. Cf. Douglas v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 81 N. H. 371, 376, 127 Atl.
703, 711 (1924); G. A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indemnity Co., 15 S. W. (2d)
544, 547 (Tex. Com. App. 1929); Hilker v. Western Automobile Insurance Co., 204 Wis.
1, 5, 231 N. W. 257, 259 (1930).
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Since the compromise payments may thus be brought within the liability of the
insurance company upon its contract of indemnity, it would seem clear that the
insured, were he to sue upon the policy, could recover from the company only
the sum remaining after deduction of those payments. It is not so clear, how-
ever, that the rights of the plaintiff, a judgment creditor, are similarly restricted.
It might well be argued that if an insurance company in negotiating settlements
prefers one claimant to the prejudice of another when it knows that settlement of
all the claims within the policy limit is unlikely, then the second claimant acquires
a light against the insurance company independent of the rights of the insured. 6
But in view of the frequent reiteration by the courts of the doctrine that a judg-
ment creditor of the insured acquires rights against the insurance company only
as subrogee of the insured,7 the imposition of such additional liability upon the
insurance company seems improbable.
Nor would considerations of public policy support a holding that an insurance
company could settle claims only at the risk of incurring liability above its policy
limit for claims which it could not compromise. Insurance companies would never
risk settlements in multiple claim cases under such a rule. The ever-increasing
congestion of court dockets8 is alone sufficient reason for favoring a contrary
policy. The saving of expense to the parties and to the community 9 when litigation
is avoided adds force to the conclusion that settlement of claims should be encour-
aged. It does not follow, however, that insurance companies should have unrestrained
liberty of action in settling claims. The insurance adjuster who persuades an
injured person to accept a sum sufficient to cover only his hospital expenses cer-
tainly deserves no encouragement. If in multiple claim cases the adjuster could
thus take advantage of the claimant's immediate need for funds and could also
threaten exhaustion of the policy by payments to other claimants, the injured per-
son might be completely at the mercy of the company. 0 Furthermore, while the
6. In some states a judgment claimant may, under certain circumstances, acquire
rights against the insurer independent of those of the insured. Metropolitan Casualty
Insurance Co. v. Albritton, 214 Ky. 16, 282 S. W. 187 (1926); Comment (1933) 42 YALE
L. J. 1103, 1106.
7. Coleman v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 247 N. Y. 271, 160 N. E. 367 (1928);
Bro v. Standard Accident Insurance Co., 194 Wis. 293, 215 N. W. 431 (1927).
8. In the Supreme Court of New York, thirty per cent of all new actions placed on
the calendar from October, 1928, to April, 1930, were automobile accident cases. About fifty
per cent of all cases tried to juries in the courts of common pleas of Philadelphia County
during that period were motor vehicle cases. RroR BY THE Com=ra To STUDY Com-
PENSATiON Fop AuTomoir.E AccIDENTs (Col. Univ. Research Council, 1932) 20; id. at
43, n. 24. In a number of large cities in which conditions were investigated the conges-
tion of the dockets had become so acute that litigation lasted from one to three years
or more. Id. at 42, n. 20.
9. The Committee computed the daily cost of running a common pleas trial court
room in Philadelphia to be $232. The average trial of an accident case took one and
one-half days. When it is considered that the verdicts in fifty-seven per cent of the cases
studied were for less than $500, and seventy-five per cent for less than $1000, the cost of
jury trials in this type of litigation seems an unwarranted burden on the community.
REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY Co'ENsATION :FOR AUTomoBE ACCIDENTS, Supra
note 8, at 37.
10. In the principal case, the insurance company at one point in its negotiations with
the plaintiff informed him that it would not be able to hold open its offer of $3500 in
settlement because of the demands of another claimant. When the plaintiff, despite this
apparent coercion, refused to accept the offer, the company issued a letter of indemnity
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preferring of one claimant over another by a company entitled to make settlements
at its own convenience may not impose additional liability upon the company, it
is not a desirable method of distributing the proceeds of the policy.
A solution of the problem which will provide for equal treatment of all of the
claimants and which will also protect the insurance company is clearly necessary.
The simplest device would perhaps be for the insurance company to settle with all
of the claimants together. If this were not possible, the company could be required
to incorporate in those compromise agreements which were executed a proviso that
they be subject to revision downward in the event that other settlements were made,
or judgments recovered, which when added to the amount of the prior settlements
exceeded the policy limit." If no such settlements were possible, the insured could
be permitted to interplead all claimants, thereby avoiding both delay and a mul-
tiplicity of suits.' 2 Similarly, any one claimant might be allowed to sue in equity
and require the others to prove their claims.' 3 All claims reduced to judgments
and all settlements, when their sum exceeded the coverage of the policy, should be
satisfied pro rata, according to the amounts of the respective settlements or judg-
ments.
14
to the other claimant for the remaining coverage of the policy, guaranteeing payment
of any judgment recovered by him within that amount. If this claimant had not later
accepted a settlement, the plaidtiff might have had no recourse to the proceeds of the
policy.
11. If only one claim remained unsettled, this safeguard could be effected by allowing
the insurer to pay immediately to claimants whose claims were settled only such pro-
portion of the total settlements as would leave unpaid on the policy that same proportion
of a final judgment for the full amount of the policy. If there were several claims out-
standing, a correspondingly smaller sum would be payable immediately on settlements
already made; for example, if two claims remained outstanding, the settlements already
made would be paid only in such proportion as would leave unpaid upon the policy an
equal proportion of two final judgments for the full coverage of the policy. If these
remaining claims were settled, or were reduced to judgments, for less than the full cover-
age of the policy, the insurer would be allowed to pay any balance due on the settlements,
and to pay the judgments pro-rata.
Such a solution of the problem would make possible immediate payment of some
money to claimants without danger of preference of any of them over the others. The
proposed scheme is open to the objection that a claimant obtaining a judgment for an
amount greater than the policy limit might not receive his full pro-rata share of the
proceeds of the policy. This objection would not seem to outweigh the advantages
of the scheme.
12. There is no technical or theoretical difficulty in allowing interpleader where the
petitioner disputes his liability in whole or in part. Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader
(1921) 30 YALE L. J. 814, 840. Under several of the more liberal statutes a petitioner may
interplead and yet, in the event of a judgment denying all of the claims, be discharged
of all liability. CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. (Deering 1931) § 386; CoNNr. GEN. StAr. (1930)
§ 5911, construed in Brown v. Clark, 80 Conn. 419, 68 AUt. 1001 (1908); N. Y. C. P. A.
(Parsons, 1932) § 287.
13. The New York Court of Appeals suggests this procedure in Bleimeyer v. Public
Service Mutual Casualty Insurance Corp., 250 N. Y. 264, 268, 165 N. E. 286, 288 (1929).
14. This procedure of dealing with all claimants as a group should be required even
though the insured appears to be solvent and able to pay any judgment above the cover-
age of the policy. A New York statute [N. Y. VHcLE AND TRAriC LAW (1929) § 17]
providing for a pro rata distribution among judgment creditors of the proceeds of the bond
required of operators of motor vehicles for hire, has been emasculated in part by a decision
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POWER OF CREDITOR TO DEFEAT CONVEYANCE IN EXECUTION OF
UNENFORCIBLE RESULTING TRUST
THE two defendant corporations, M and N, were organized and solely owned and
managed by two brothers, also defendants. In a purchase of real estate from the
plaintiff's assignor, a substantial down payment was made by N corporation. Legal
title, however, was taken by M corporation, which executed a bond and mortgage
for the balance of the purchase price. It was understood that N corporation was to
be the beneficial owner of the property and have charge of its operation and main-
tenance. Taxes, mortgage installments and carrying charges were paid by N cor-
poration. Several other properties were purchased by the defendants under the
same arrangement. Later, upon default of M corporation on its bond, the plaintiff
instituted foreclosure proceedings resulting in a deficiency judgment against the M
corporation. While this action was pending, the latter stripped itself of all assets
by conveying to N corporation the properties it had acquired subsequent to the
purchase from the plaintiff's assignor. The plaintiff, in order to satisfy the deficiency
judgment out of these properties, sought to defeat the transfer. The New York
Court of Appeals, two judges dissenting, refused to recognize a trust relationship
between the two corporations, and set aside the conveyance as being without con-
sideration and a fraud upon creditors.'
It is well established that a conveyance without consideration, stripping a debtor
of all his assets, is fraudulent as to creditors. 2 To obviate the effect of this rule,
the defendants urged that the transfer had been made in execution of a valid trust
obligation.3 The absence of a written agreement, however, would preclude the
existence of an enforceable express trust.4 Nor can N corporation be considered
the beneficiary of a resulting trust, for a New York statute has abolished such
trusts. While under an exception to this rule, recovery is sometimes granted on a
constructive trust theory to avoid abuse of a relation of confidence, 6 the court in
the instant case refused to find such a relationship existing between the two cor-
porations.
of the Appellate Division holding that the provisions of the statute do not apply until
the insured becomes insolvent or bankrupt. Long Island Coach Co. v. Hartford Acd-
dent & Indemnity Co., 223 App. Div. 331, 334, 227 N. Y. Supp. 633, 636 (1st Dep't.
1928), aff'd, 248 N. Y. 629, 162 N. E. 552 (1928). The purpose of the statute is de-
feated under this interpretation because the insolvency of the insured seldom becomes
apparent until the injured party seeks recourse against him. By that time, the policy
limit may well be exhausted by payment of settlements or other judgments. In order to
protect injured claimants, therefore, the insurer should not be allowed to exhaust the cover-
age of the policy because the insured is to all outward appearances solvent.
1. Fraw Realty Co. v. Natanson, 261 N. Y. 396, 185 N. E. 679 (1933); noted in (1933)
33 CoL. L. REv. 1066.
2. N. Y. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW (1909) § 273; Cole v. Tyler, 65 N. Y. 73 (1875);
see Halsey v. W'mant, 233 App. Div. 103, 112, 251 N. Y. Supp. 81, 91 (1st Dep't 1931).
3. One holding naked legal title as trustee for another has no interest in the property
which his creditors can reach. Fehilg v. Busch, 165 Mo. 144, 65 S. W. 542 (1901) (result-
ing trust); Liberty Trust Co. v. Hayes, 244 Mass. 251, 138 N. E. 582 (1923) (resulting
trust); Frank v. Linkop Realty Corp., 106 N. J. Eq. 567, 151 Atl. 550 (1930) (express
trust).
4. N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW (1909) § 242.
5. Id. § 94.
6. Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 145 N. Y. 313, 39 N. E. 1067 (1895) (mother and son);
Foreman v. Foreman, 251 N. Y. 237, 167 N. E. 428 (1929) (husband and wife).
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The decision to set aside the transfer may perhaps be attributed to the court's
disfavor of the conduct of business in a manner susceptible of fraudulent practices.
However, this device, common in real estate transactions, of avoiding liability for
a deficiency judgment on purchase-money bonds by placing legal title to the mort-
gaged property in the name of a personal agent or "dummy," has long been ac-
corded legal sanction.7 Where the mortgagee knows he is dealing with a "dummy,"
he is actually contracting for the land as his sole security. Since in the instant case
there was no misrepresentation as to the real ownership of the property, there
would seem to be slight justification for enlarging the mortgagee's security merely
because the "dummy" in this transaction was a corporation holding legal title to
other property. Furthermore, since this additional property had been acquired
after the plaintiff's assignor had sold the mortgaged realty to the defendants and
extended credit to M corporation on the purchase-money obligation, the plaintiff
cannot claim reliance on the apparent ownership of other property by the nominal
mortgagor.8
The "trust" concept is sufficiently flexible to have enabled the court to sustain the
conveyance had it wished to give effect to the business practice involved. Thus,
as the dissent indicates, 9 a relation of confidence sufficient to give rise to a construc-
tive trust may readily be found in the identity of stock ownership and control of
the two corporations."0 Similarly, the payment of carrying charges on the property
by N corporation may be regarded as constituting performance of sufficient un-
equivocal acts relative to that corporation's obligation under the trust understanding
to make it enforceable as an express trust despite the absence of a writing.11 More-
over, though the agreement to hold the legal title for one who has paid the purchase
price of land may be unenforceable as between the parties, it has been held that
where the "trustee" is willing to carry out the unenforceable "trust," his creditors
have no cause for complaint.12 Hence, the court might, consistent with established
doctrine, have sustained a legally justifiable method of avoiding deficiency judg-
ments.13
7. Cf. Briggs v. Partridge, 64 N. Y. 357 (1876) (undisclosed principal not liable on
agent's executory contract under seal); Crowley v. Lewis, 239 N. Y. 264, 146 N. E. 374
(1925).
8. Where such reliance existed, the conveyance has been set aside, even though there
was no misrepresentation by the beneficiary. Bryant v. Klatt, 2 F. (2d) 167 (S. D. N. Y.
1924); Fritz v. Worden, 20 App. Div. 241, 46 N. Y. Supp. 1040 (4th Dep't 1897); Heg-
stad v. Wysiecki, 178 App. Div. 733, 165 N. Y. Supp. 898 (2d Dep't 1917); Budd v.
Atkinson, 30 N. J. Eq. 530 (1879). Similarly, where the beneficiary knew of misrepresenta-
tion by the trustee. Besson v. Eveland, 26 N. J. Eq. 468 (1875). Contra: Davis v. Graves,
29 Barb. 480 (N. Y. 1859); Hayes v. Reger, 102 Ind. 524, 1 N. E. 386 (1885).
9. Fraw Realty Co. v. Natanson, supra note 1, at 412, 185 N. E. at 684.
10. See note 6, supra.
11. Jeremiah v. Pitcher, 26 App. Div. 402, 49 N. Y. Supp. 788 (2d Dept 1898), aff'd,
163 N. Y. 574, 57 N. E. 1113 (1900); McKinley v. Hessen, 202 N. Y. 24, 95 N. E. 32
(1911) (parole trust enforceable where beneficiary paid taxes, interest, repairs, and im-
provements).
12. Bryant v. Klatt, supra note 8; Dunn v. Whalen, 66 Hun 634, 21 N. Y. Supp. 869
(N. Y. 1893) (creditor's bill); Desmond v. Myers, 113 Mich. 437, 71 N. W. 877 (1897)
(judgment creditor's bill in aid of execution); Silvers v. Potter, 48 N. J. Eq. 539, 22 Atl.
584 (1891) (action to set aside conveyance). The rule is the same even where creditors
relied upon the "trustee's" apparent ownership. Davis v. Graves, supra note 8 (receiver's
action to set aside conveyance) ; Hayes v. Reger, supra note 8 (judgment creditor's bill in
aid of execution).
13. Recent statutes limiting the right to deficiency judgments indicate a new policy
to restrict a mortgagee's claim to the value of the mortgaged property. See Comment
(1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1236.
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STATE JURISDICTION OVER INTERSTATE SHIPMENTS OF 3.2 BEER*
A GEORGIA sheriff seized a truck load of 3.2 beer in the course of transportation
from Tennessee to Florida under a through bill of lading. Tennessee and Florida
have legalized 3.2 beer, but Georgia has not. The carrier sought an injunction in
the federal district court to restrain the sheriff from future interference with similar
interstate shipments, and requested the return of his truck and beer. An interlocu-
tory injunction was refused on the ground that the plaintiff, by merely pleading the
federal Beer Act,' had not sustained his burden of proving that the beer was not
an intoxicating liquor under the Eighteenth Amendment.2
Section 2 of the Eighteenth Amendment confers upon the states powers of en-
forcement concurrent with those of Congress, and the Supreme Court has declared
that such powers are not to be divided between Congress and the states along the
lines which separate or distinguish interstate from intrastate commerce.3 If 3.2
beer is in fact intoxicating, therefore, it is contraband, and the state may seize it
even though it is moving in interstate commerce. If, however, it is non-intoxicating,
it is a legitimate article of interstate commerce and may not be seized as long as
it is being transported through and not into the state.4  It is true that the Beer
Act does not expressly state that 3.2 beer is not intoxicating. Nevertheless, Section
4 does expressly provide for the issuance of permits for the manufacture and sale of
alcoholic beverages containing not more than 3.2 percent of alcohol by weight.
This section would be unconstitutional under the Eighteenth Amendment unless
such beverages were non-intoxicating.5 It would seem, therefore, that the plaintiff,
by introducing in evidence the act under which his permit was issued, established a
prima facie case that 3.2 beer is not intoxicating. The burden of proof then rested
upon the party who, in questioning its legality, challenged the constitutionality of
the Beer Act.0
The court argued, however, that even if .Congress defined 3.2 beer as non-intoxicat-
ing, its definition is not binding on the several states, and that the case was there-
fore governed by the Georgia laws, which, according to the court, "undoubtedly ...
make it unlawful to possess or transport intoxicating liquor within the state, whether
. moving in interstate commerce or not." 7 That Congress did not in fact intend
the Beer Act to be binding on the states within their jurisdictions is evinced by
the reenactment of the Webb-Kenyon Act 8 and the Reed Amendment 9 almost
*The following discussion bears upon litigation the operative facts of which occurred prior
to the ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment.
1. P. L. No. 3, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933), 27 U. S. C. A. § 64a et seq. (1933).
2. Richmire v. Legg, 3 F. Supp. 787 (N. D. Ga. 1933).
3. National Prohibition Cases, 253 U. S. 350, 387 (1920).
4. Adams Express Co. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 214 U. S. 218 (1909).
5. National Prohibition Cases, supra note 3, at 386 (1920).
6. Township of Pine Grove v. Talcott, 19 Wall. 666, 673 (1873).
7. The Georgia prohibition law provides that "It shall be unlawful ...to transport,
ship or carry .. .from any point without this State to any point within this State, or
from place to place within this State . . . any intoxicating liquors." GA. CODE Amx.
(Michie, 1926) Pen. Code § 448 (36). Furthermore, "No property rights of any kind
shall exist" in prohibited liquors, or in the vessels "kept or used for the purpose of violat-
ing any provision of this Act." Id. § 448 (21).
8. 37 STAT. 699 (1913). The Webb-Kenyon Act was designed to prevent the immunity
of interstate commerce from being used to permit the receipt of liquor through such
commerce in states whose laws forbid its ownership. Clark Distilling Co. v. Western
Maryland Ry. Co., 242 U. S. 311, 324 (1917).
9. 39 STAT. 1069 (1917). The Reed Amendment, prohibiting the transportation of
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verbatim in Sections 6 and 7. Prior to the Eighteenth Amendment these laws, sup-
plementing the Wilson Act,' 0 conferred upon the several states certain powers of
regulating interstate commerce in alcoholic beverages. But under no one of them
does the state have jurisdiction over alcoholic beverages traveling across the state
and having no destination therein. The Eighteenth Amendment, as has been said,
added to the jurisdiction of each state concurrent power to enforce the prohibition
of intoxicating liquors, even if without destination within its boundaries. But it
does not follow that the individual states were thereby given power to define what
should be considered an intoxicating liquor for purposes of interstate commerce.
That power has always been reserved to Congress," and unless its pronouncement
conflicts with the Eighteenth Amendment, a fact which must be affirmatively shown,
interstate commerce in beverages is governed exclusively thereby. This interpreta-
tion of the extent of state jurisdiction under the Eighteenth Amendment was adopted
by the Supreme Court of Georgia 12 when it declared, contrary to the court in the
principal case, that Georgia has no law forbidding the movement of liquor across
the state under a federal permit the constitutionality of which is not denied, and
that if it had, such law would be invalid because in conflict with the interstate com-
merce clause. In the same case the Georgia court granted an injunction against a
sheriff who had seized a carload of medicinal liquor in course of transportation
through the state, on the ground that a prima facie case of compliance with the law
of the land was established by pleading a federal permit acquired under the terms
of the National Prohibition Act. The Beer Act, in providing for permits for the
manufacture and sale of 3.2 beer, similarly exempts such beverage from the opera-
tion of the Eighteenth Amendment. Without affirmative proof of the unconstitu-
tionality of the Act, therefore, the state's seizure of the beer in the instant case was
beyond the scope of its authority.
PROPRIETY OF RAISING MUNICIPAL TAX RATE TO ALLOW FOR DELINQUENCIES
THE tremendous increase in municipal tax delinquency during recent months is
perhaps the most important single cause of the present financial plight of many
cities.' In 1926, the average rate of delinquency in twenty-four American cities
was 5.8%.2 It has been estimated that the average rate in 1929 for fourteen of
the largest cities of the country was 7.93%.3 Today the rate in some of those
cities is thirty to forty times higher than it was before the depression, while the
liquor into any state contrary to the laws of that state, refers to the state of destination,
and does not prevent the movement of liquor in interstate commerce across a state. United
States v. Gudger, 249 U. S. 373 (1919).
10. 26 STAT. 313 (1890). Under the Wilson Act liquor became subject to state law
immediately upon delivery to the consignee, whether in the original package or not.
Delanater v. South Dakota, 205 U. S. 93 (1907).
11. License Cases, 5 How. 504, 599 (1847); In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545 (1891).
12. W. A. Gaines & Co. v. Holmes, 154 Ga. 344, 114 S. E. 327 (1922).
1. "Collection of the city's tax arrears would end the city's financial troubles." Samuel
Untermyer, discussing New York City's affairs in the N. Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1933, at 1.
Also, see Bird, The Present Financial Status of 135 Cities in the United States and Canada,
MuwricaPA ADmiNsrsTAT N SERVIcE (1931) Statistical Series No. 5, at 4.
2. Computed from figures collected by the Philadelphia Bureau of Municipal Research,
printed in (1926) 35 Am. Crr 741.
3. Bird, supra note 1, at 5.
19331 NOTES
144 YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43
estimated average is 26%. 4 The general financial distress of taxpayers, the vacancy
of industrial and residential buildings formerly productive of revenue, and the
general reduction in rents and land values are important among the many causes
of increased tax delinquencies. The rising percentages of municipal revenue re-
quired for debt service, from which there is no return visible to the taxpayer, are
said to add to the reluctance with which taxes are paid.5
A few state legislatures, recognizing the probability of tax delinquencies, have
given taxing officials authority to add a definite percentage to the tax rate to pro-
vide therefor.6 In most cases, however, the percentages thus specified are too low
to take care of the present emergency in city finances. 7 In some states municipal
taxing authorities are permitted to raise the tax rate at their own discretion to
allow for delinquencies,8 but most statutes merely direct that the tax rate be such
as will produce the revenue needed, no mention being made of delinquencies.9 Inter-
preting the latter types of statutes, the courts have invoked a presumption of validity
4. Although delinquency rates are computed differently by different cities, so that com-
parisons as between the cities are not strictly accurate, the following table gives a graphic
picture of the present situation. The figures are collected from (1926) 35 Am. C=rv 741;
HEAEINOS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY OF THE HousE or REPRESENTATIvES,
73d Cong., 1st Sess., on H. R. 1670, 3083, 4311, 5267; Bird, supra note 1, at 5.
1926 1928 1930 Latest estimate
Boston ................... 11.15 -- 20.0
Detroit ................... 0.99 6.0 15.0 36.0
Flint, Mich ................ - 12.2 19.2 78.0
Milwaukee ................ - 3.52 1234 40.0
Minneapolis ............... 0.51 - 5.14 15.0 to 25.0
New Orleans .............. 8.0 - - 25.0
New York ................ 10.60 14.2 15.9 43.0
Philadelphia ............... 5.97 13.02 -
Pontiac, Mich ............. 5.2 26.6 43.1
5. For figures on the increases of bonded indebtedness in cities, see Bird, supra note
1, at 17. For the effect of this, see testimony of Mayor Frank Murphy of Detroit, a city
devoting 76%o of its revenue to debt service in 1933, in the HEAsnGS BEFORE TnE CoM-
m-FE oN THE JUDIciARY, supra note 4, at 85.
6. Aax. DIG. STAT. Supp. (Castle, 1927) § 7690b (in raising money to pay principal
and interest on bonds, the authorities may add 10% for "unforeseen contingencies") ; CAL.
POL. CODE (Deering, 1932) § 3713 (5% to be added for delinquencies in determining state
tax rate to compensate for annual deficiencies) ; OK.A. STAT. (1931) § 12673 (10% may be
added for delinquencies in the general property tax); TEX. REv. Civ. CODE (Vernon, 1928)
art. 7043 (20% shall be added to total sum which must be collected by taxes, before
computation of rate).
7. A provision in the Oklahoma statute empowering the officers of a municipal corpora-
tion to add 25% for delinquencies in levying for a sinking fund seems to be the most
generous law now in force. OYLA. STAT. (1931) § 5913.
8. CoNx. PuB. AcTs (1931) § 41a (authorities to fix a rate, "with due provision for
estimated uncollectible taxes," sufficient to pay the expenses of the town); ME. REv. STAT.
(1930) c. 13, § 68 (up to 2% may be added to the rate).
9. For example, see Aiz. REv. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 3105; MAss. GEN. LAws
(1932) c. 59, § 23; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) § 69-605. Such a statute is found in Penn-
sylvania, where the authorities may fix a rate up to 15 mills on the dollar that "will fully
meet and cover" all estimated expenses. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1932) § 12198-1810,
12198-2551.
of a tax rate and have upheld allowances for collection costs and for delinquencies,' 0
unless the objector has proved the rate to be so grossly excessive as to show a lack
of good faith or of sound business judgment on the part of the taxing authorities."
In Fitzpatrick v. Thomas,12 it appeared that the proportion of delinquent taxes
in the city of Sharon, Pennsylvania, in 1932, was ten times greater than in any
preceding year. In determining the tax rate for 1933, the city council estimated
that there would be delinquencies amounting to 40% of the levy. The Pennsyl-
vania statute permitted a tax rate that would "fully meet and cover" all expenses.13
To allow for this anticipated delinquency, the council fixed upon dt rate which would
result in 40% more revenue than needed if all taxes should be paid. On a bill filed
by taxpayers, an injunction was issued restraining the collection of taxes at this rate.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed the taxpayers' bill and held that, in
the absence of an allegation that the taxing authorities had acted in bad faith, even
a 40% increase in the rate to provide for delinquencies was a valid exercise of
administrative discretion. Mr. Justice Kephart in a dissenting opinion pointed
out that such an increase opens the door to laxity in the collection of municipal
taxes, and urged adoption of a "presumption of collectibility" in the determination
of the legality of a tax rate.
Solution of the problem of municipal tax delinquency cannot be found in pre-
cipitate advances in the tax rate. Such advances place an altogether excessive bur-
den upon the more fortunate or more conscientious citizens who are able to and do
pay their tax obligations. Moreover, every increase in taxes adds to the delinquency
list the names of persons theretofore able to meet their assessments; the result-
ing vicious circle clearly demonstrates the inadequacy of this means of solving the
delinquency problem.14 On the other hand, literal enforcement of a presumption
of collectibility, as suggested in the dissenting opinion in the principal case, would
disregard the practical problem of securing the necessary funds for city expenses.
To deprive the taxing authorities of all discretion in determining rates would be
as dangerous as to permit them to raise the taxes arbitrarily. The presumption
of collectibility might well be used, however, to place upon the taxing authorities
the burden of justifying an allowance for anticipated delinquencies by proving that
all reasonable efforts have been made to collect the taxes. Collectors should go after
the taxes, not wait for them to come in.15 Adequate notice to delinquents, lacking
to a surprising extent, and permission for payment of taxes by installments, are
10. Vornberg v. Dunn, 143 Ga. 111, 117, 84 S. E. 370, 373 (1915); Edwards v. People,
88 Ill. 340, 343 (1878); Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern Rr. Co. v. People, 200 ]11. 541,
548, 66 N. E. 148, 150 (1902); People v. Chicago & Alton Rr. Co., 257 Il1. 208, 212, 100
N. E. 502, 504 (1912); People v. Chicago & Alton Ry. Co., 289 Ill. 282, 288, 124 N. E.
658, 660 (1919); People v. Chicago, Burlington & ( incy Rr. Co., 290 Ill. 327, 346, 125
N. E. 310, 318 (1919), all permitting allowances for delinquencies; Chicago & Alton Rr.
Co. v. Baldridge, 177 Ill. 229, 232, 52 N. E. 263 (1898) (permitting an allowance for
payment of a commission to the collector).
11. People v. Chicago & Alton Rr. Co., 324 Ill. 179, 154 N. E. 893 (1926); State v.
St. Louis & San Francisco Rr. Co., 321 Mo. 35, 10 S. W. (2d) 918 (1928).
12. 166 Atl. 493 (Pa. 1933).
13. See note 9, supra.
14. "If they cannot pay the lower rate, how in the world can yo± expect them to pay
a higher rate?" Paul V. Betters, of the American Municipal Association, quoted in H11EA-
3Xns REFORE TIM CoMrrrE ON TE JuDiciARY, supra note 4, at 83.
15. Preliminary Report of the Committee of the National Tax Association on Tax
Delinquency, PROCEmINGS or m TwENTY-FrrnH NATIONAL CONFERENCE, NATIONAL TAX
AssocIATIoN (1932) 305. This report, presented by Professor Fred R. Fairchild of Yale,
contains an excellent analysis of the problem and its remedies.
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probably responsible in part for lower delinquency rates in some cities. Prompt
imposition of a heavy penalty when defaults occur is, in normal times, a most
effective aid to the collection of taxes; 16 but the efficacy of such a penalty during
a depression, when inability rather than unwillingness to pay is the most frequent
cause of default, may well be doubted.
CONSTRUCTION OF GIFT TO DONEE FOR USE IN PROMOTING ENDS OF JUSTICE
TESTATRIX, a former member of the faculty of Wellesley College and an ardent sup-
porter of movements for the benefit of the lower classes, undertook to dispose of
her estate in a will drawn up without legal advice. In the will she requested that
the "Internationale" be sung at her funeral; the nature of her sympathies was
further evidenced by her provision of a fund for the establishment of a school for
women industrial workers and by her substantial gifts to organizations for the pro-
motion of free thought. By a residuary gift testatrix gave a large part of her estate
to Mr. Arthur Garfield Hayes, with whom she had long been associated, for him
"to use at his discretion in promoting the ends of justice." After the death of
testatrix a controversy arose between the executor of her estate and Mr. Hays as
to the proper interpretation of this residuary gift. The New York Surrogate's Court
recently held that the bequest was an absolute gift to Mr. Hays with only a moral
obligation on him to carry out the wishes of the testatrix.1
It was clearly the intention of testatrix that the funds included in her residuary
bequest be devoted entirely to such uses as the protection of civil liberties, the
improvement of hours and conditions of labor, and the promotion of free thought.
It may well be questioned whether the court's construction of the gift as absolute,
though subject to a moral obligation, will prove a satisfactory method of carrying
out this intention. Should the legatee appropriate the gift to his own uses, or should
his creditors attempt to reach the fund, no court could interfere if it is said to be
his absolutely; whereas a court of equity would retain control of the property
if he were said to take it as a trustee.2  Misappropriation is probably a remote
contingency in the principal case in view of the character of the legatee, but a
similar problem would arise in the event of his death, upon which, if the gift is
absolute, any unexpended funds would pass to his testamentary 3 or intestate suc-
cessor-a result certainly not contemplated by the testatrix.
Had it so desired, the court in the principal case clearly could have impressed
the testatrix's residuary gift with a valid trust. The fact that the testatrix failed
to use words of trust would not necessarily preclude the creation of a trust rela-
tionship, for the will as a whole together with the extrinsic circumstances affords
adequate evidence of an intention that the limitations on the use of the gift be
mandatory.4 Although a trust thufs created would lack definite cestuis, 5 it could be
16. (1926) 35 A.m. CrrY 741; Chatters, Methods That Have Proved Successful in Collect-
ink Delinquent Taxes (1929) 40 Am. CITY (no. 3) 108.
1. In re Hayes' Estate, 146 Misc. 660, 263 N. Y. Supp. 730 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
2. BOGERT, TRUSTS (1921) 327.
3. It is of course possible that Mr. Hays might bequeath the funds received from
testatrix in such manner as to carry out her wishes.
4. A precatory trust will be created notwithstanding the absence of express words
of trust when the circumstances indicate an intent to devote the estate to a particular
purpose. Thomas v. Buck, 236 Ky. 241, 32 S. W. (2d) 1006 (1930); Sherwin v. Smith,
185 N. E. 17 (Mass. 1933); Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst, 220 Mich. 321, 190 N. W.
250 (1922); In re Daintrey's Estate, 125 Misc. 369, 211 N. Y. Supp. 529 (Surr. Ct. 1925);
see collection of cases in Note (1927) 49 A. L. R. 10.
5. Definite cestuis are usually essential to the validity of private trusts; but the cestuis
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sustained as a charitable trust, since almost any purpose which is for the benefit
of society will suffice to bring a trust within this much-favored category. 6 Thus,
trusts have been upheld as charitable when they were for improving the structure
of the government; 7 for bettering economic conditions and obtaining justice be-
tween employer and employee; 8 for teaching the principles of socialism; 9 and for
distributing literature on communism.1 0 A trust in the principal case could hardly
be invalidated as contrary to public policy, for though trusts to disseminate un-
Christian doctrines"
1 or for the purpose of changing the laws of the country 
1 2
have occasionally been avoided on that ground, a wide variety have been upheld
as charitable.'
3
The objection that the purpose of a charitable trust must be explained with
reasonable certainty,' 4 so that the court can administer the trust with due regard
to the testator's intention may similarly be disposed of. The partiality of the
courts to charitable trusts leads them to construe the requirement broadly; bequests
in which the trustee was given complete discretion to dispose of the fund for
charitable purposes, as was the legatee in the principal case, have frequently been
upheld.15 Nor would administration of a trust in the principal case be impracticable.
of a charitable trust are necessarily indefinite. Clark v. Campbell, .82 N. H. 281, 133
Ati. 166 (1926); BOGERT, op. ct. supra note 2, at 192, 422.
6. Tarver v. Weaver, 221 Ala. 663, 130 So. 209 (1930); Taylor v. Hoag, 273 Pa. 194,
116 AtI. 826 (1922); see School of Domestic Arts v. Carr, 322 Ill. 562, 569, 153 N. E.
669, 671 (1926).
7. Taylor v. Hoag, supra note 6; Harrison's Estate, 50 Pa. Co. Ct. 200 (1921) (for
municipal improvements).
8. Collier v. Lindley, 203 Cal. 641, 266 Pac. 526 (1928).
9. Peth v. Spear, 63 Wash. 291, 115 Pac. 164 (1911).
10. George v. Braddock, 45 N. J. Eq. 757, 18 AtI. 881 (1889).
11. Zeisweiss v. James, 63 Pa. 465 (1870); see Manners v. Philadelphia Library Co.,
93 Pa. 165, 172 (1880). A contrary result might well be reached today. Bowman v.
Secular Society, [1917] A. C. 406; see also (1923) 21 MIcH. L. REv. 482.
12. Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539 (1867); Bowditch v. Attorney General, 241 Mass.
168, 134 N. E. 796 (1922); In re Killen's Will, 124 Misc. 720, 209 N. Y. Supp. 206 (Surr.
Ct. 1925). Contra: Garrison v. Little, 75 Ill. App. 402 (1897); Taylor v. Hoag, supra
note 6. On this subject see Bartlett, Charitable Trusts to Effect Changes in the Law
(1928) 16 CAim-. L. REv. 478.
13. Parkhurst v. Burrill, 228 Mass. 196, 117 N. E. 39 (1917) (for promotion of peace);
Glover v. Baker, 76 N. H. 393, 83 AtI. 916 (1912) (for promotion of Christian Science);
Vineland Trust Co. v. Westendorf, 86 N. J. Eq. 343, 98 Atl. 314 (1916) (for furtherance
of metaphysical thought); Besant v. German Reich, 145 L. T. 254 (1931) (for German
soldiers disabled in World War). See also cases cited supra notes 6 to 10.
14. In re Vance's Estate, 118 Cal. App. 163, 4 P. (2d) 977 (1931); Thomas v. Davis,
[1933] 1 Ch. 225. The requirement of a definite purpose does not conflict with, but arises
because of the permitted indefiniteness of the cestuis in a charitable trust. Collier v. Lindley,
supra note 8; Cheshire Bank and Trust Co. v. Doolittle, 113 Conn. 231, 155 Atl. 82 (1931);
Peth v. Spear, supra note 9; BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 200.
15. Chicago Bank of Commerce v. McPherson, 62 F. (2d) 393 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932);
Clark v. Cummings, 83 N. H. 27, 137 At. 660 (1927); In re Welch, 105 Misc. 27, 172
N. Y. Supp. 349 (Surr. Ct. 1918); Anderson's Estate, 269 Pa. 535, 112 Atl. 766 (1921).
Contra: Gooding v. Watson's Trustee, 235 Ky. 562, 31 S. W. (2d) 919 (1930); Wentura
v. Kinnerk, 5 S. W. (2d) 66 (Mo. 1928).
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If the trustee were to die or become incapacitated before the termination of the
trust, the court could appoint a new trustee,16 presumably some person engaged
in similar activities and having similar sympathies, and could direct him to approxi-
mate the wishes of the grantor under the doctrine of cy pres.17
The court's decision in the principal case that the testatrix's residuary bequest
constituted not a trust but an absolute gift may be explained on several grounds.
In the first place, the argument that a valid charitable trust might have been created
was probably not advanced at the trial, for Mr. Hays attempted to show that an
absolute gift was intended, and the executor urged that the bequest constituted
an invalid trust. The court's rejection of the latter contention is understandable;
for if the trust were invalidated either for uncertainty or because its purpose was
not considered charitable, the undesirable result of partial intestacy would follow,' 8
and the property would pass to the intestate successors 19 in contravention of the
obvious intent of the testatrix. Furthermore, the court's decision is in accord with
the New York cases which have consistently disapproved of precatory trusts except
in the clearest cases.
20
DISPOSITION OF INSURANCE PROCEEDS ARISING OUT OF DESTRUCTION OF
SUBJECT-MATTER OF OPTION AGREEMENT
THE defendant leased certain premises to the plaintiff for three years, giving the
lessee an option to purchase before the expiration of the term. Four months later,
16. Because American courts are not said to possess the prerogative cy pres power,
some cases have held that a charitable trust with full discretion in the trustee as to the
disposal of the fund terminates on the'retirement or death of the trustee. Hall v. Harvey,
77 N. H. 82, 88 Atl. 97 (1913); In re Chellew's Estate, 127 Wash. 382, 221 Pac. 3 (1923).
But cf. P-RRY, TRUSTS (7th ed. 1929) § 721, 731. New York formerly held this view.
Beekman v. Bonsor, 23 N. Y. 298 (1861). But by statute the New York Supreme Court
has been given power to administer indefinite charitable trusts and to appoint a trustee
i none is named. N. Y. PasoxAL PRoPEarY LAW (1917) § 12, subdiv. 1. And this has
been construed to authorize the continuation of the trust although the trustees who were
vested with discretion are deceased. In re McLoghlin's Estate, 139 Misc. 202, 248 N. Y.
Supp. 253 (Surr. Ct. 1931) (fund to be used for charitable purposes in trustee's discretion).
The same result has been reached in Pennsylvania by statute. De Silver's Estate, 211 Pa.
459, 60 Ati. 1048 (1905); Thompson's Estate, 282 Pa. 30, 127 AUt. 446 (1925). And the
courts have appointed new trustees in similar cases in Massachusetts without statutory
authority. Minot v. Baker, 147 Mass. 348, 17 N. E. 839 (1888); Binney v. Attorney
General, 259 Mass. 539, 156 N. E. 724 (1927).
17. Under this doctrine the equity court may substitute a new and similar use for
property given to charity when the original purpose becomes impossible of realization or
when the testator has imperfectly outlined his scheme. BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 2, at
225; see note 16, supra.
18. Courts generally seek to avoid intestacy as to any part of the estate. Meeks v.
Meeks, 161 N. Y. 66, 55 N. E. 278 (1899); see Waterman v. New York Life Insurance
and Trust Co., 237 N. Y. 293, 300, 142 N. E. 668, 670 (1923).
19. Buzzell v. Fogg, 120 Me. 158, 113 At. 50 (1921); Gooding v. Watson's Trustee;
Wentura v. Kinnerk, both supra note 15.
20. Tillman v. Ogren, 227 N. Y. 495, 125 N. E. 821 (1920); Webster v. Gleizes, 251
N. Y. 554, 168 N. E. 425 (1929); In re Abbe's Estate, 138 Misc. 210, 245 N. Y. Supp. 291
(Surr. Ct. 1930). Such trusts have been disapproved of even where the word "trust"
was used. In re Bogan's Estate, 129 Misc. 119, 221 N. Y. Supp. 604 (Surr. Ct. 1927).
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buildings on the leased premises were destroyed by fire. The lessor, at whose ex-
pense the property had been insured, refused a demand by the lessee to rebuild,
and effected a cash settlement with the insurance company. The lessee continued
in possession, however, paying taxes, interest, and a substantial part of the mortgage
pursuant to the terms of the option agreement. Upon the lessee's subsequent election
to exercise his option, the court held that the insurance money stood in lieu of the
burned property, and could be recovered by the purchaser.1
In practice, where property under an option to purchase is destroyed by fire, an
election to buy will be made only when the insurance proceeds exceed the contract
price of the injured property. Thus, the problem has been the final disposition of
an unearned profit arising out of the fortuitous destruction of the subject-matter of
the contract. In such situations, both in the case of mere option agreements, 2 and
in that of leases with an option to purchase, 3 the stated rule has been that the
owner of the property need not account to the optionee for the insurance money he
has collected. Since the optionor has generally paid for the insurance and would
bear the loss if the value of the property exceeded the insurance proceeds, the
equities would normally seem to be in his favor. The courts, however, in apparent
disregard of such factors have preferred to rest their decisions upon the technical
legal ground that an option agreement conveys no estate or interest in the property
prior to an acceptance, 4 or upon the doctrine that an insurance policy is a personal
contract between the optionor and the underwriter to which the optionee is not a
party.6  An exercise of the option is therefore considered an election to purchase
the premises at the agreed contract price in the condition in which they are at the
date of the acceptance. 0
A number of courts, on the other hand, have taken the position that the damaged
property and the insurance money together constitute the estate to be conveyed,
and have granted the lessee-optionee a credit of the insurance proceeds against the
contract price.7 This has been achieved largely through an extension of the doctrine
of equitable conversions to option agreements. 9  Under this view, the optionee-
1. Dolan v. Spencer, 92 Colo. 389, 21 P. (2d) 411 (1933).
2. Strong v. Moore, 105 Ore. 12, 207 Pac. 179 (1922); id., 118 Ore. 649, 245 Pac. 505
(1926); Clark v. Burr, 85 Wis. 649, 55 N. W. 401 (1893).
3. Caldwell v. Frazier, 65 Kan. 24, 68 Pac. 1076 (1902); Gamble v. Garlock, 116 Minn.
59, 133 N. W. 175 (1911); Panhandle Oil Co. v. Therrell, 158 Miss. 810, 131 So. 263
(1930); Trumbull v. Bombard, 171 App. Div. 700, 157 N. Y. Supp. 794 (3d Dep't 1916);
Rutherford v. MacQueen, 111 W. Va. 353, 161 S. E. 612 (1931); Edwards v. West, 7
Ch. D. 858 (Eng. 1878).
4. Gamble v. Garlock, supra note 3, at 62, 133 N. W. at 176.
5. Strong v. Moore, supra note 2, at 654, 245 Pac. at 507; JAxws, OP ToN CoNTRACrs
(1916) § 512.
6. Caldwell v. Frazier, supra note 3, at 27, 68 Pac. at 1077; Panhandle Oil Co. v. Ther-
rell, supra note 3.
7. Kaufman v. All Persons, 16 Cal. App. 388, 117 Pac. 586 (1911); Williams v. Lilley,
67 Conn. 50, 34 AUt. 765 (1895); Peoples Street Ry. Co. v. Spencer, 156 Pa. 85, 27 Atl.
113 (1893); Schnee v. Elston, 299 Pa. 100, 149 Atl. 108 (1930); Carnation Lumber and
Shingle Co. v. Tolt Land Co., 103 Wash. 633, 175 Pac. 331 (1918); Reynard v. Arnold,
23 W. R. 804 (Eng. 1875).
8. The theory of equitable conversion is widely applied to executory contracts for the
tale of land for the purpose of constituting the vendee an equitable owner of the premises
and the vendor the trustee of the legal title. See 1 Po-mzoy, EQurr JUSMPRUDENCE
(4th ed. 1918) §§ 371, 372. For a critical discussion of the doctrine as applied to executory
contracts, see Stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract (1913) 13 COL. L. REv. 369.
9. Peoples Street Ry. Co. v. Spencer; Schnee v. Elston, both supra note 7; see Williams
v. Lilley, supra note 7, at 62, 34 Atl. at 769.
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lessee has been considered an equitable owner of the premises for the duration of
his option, so that upon an election to purchase, the acceptance relates back for all
purposes to the beginning of the transaction.' 0 A similar result has been reached
by an analogous distortion of some other legal doctrine. Thus, where the lessee-
optionee has paid a substantial part of the purchase price for his option,'1 or has
assumed the duties of ownership before the fire loss, 12 he has been credited with
the insurance money on the ground that the parties considered him an inchoate
purchaser under an executory contract. Similarly, where the lease and option agree-
ment stipulated that the insurance proceeds were to be used in rebuilding the de-
stroyed property, it has been held that the parties have expressly contracted against
the rule that such funds may be retained by the optionor.13 A significant element
common to these cases has been the payment of insurance premiums by the optionee-
lessee. This factor, however, seems to have been ignored, perhaps because the loss
is generally made payable to the owner of the property.
It is doubtful whether argument by analogy to equitable conversion or executory
contracts serves a useful function in determining the ultimate disposition of the
insurance proceeds. Such concepts are at best mere rationalizations of the result
reached. Actually, the party who has borne the expense of insurance has been
awarded the proceeds of the policy, although no express judicial articulation has
been given to such a principle. The instant case represents a departure in that the
insurance money was credited to the optionee though the owner of the property
had paid the premiums. The optionee, however, in electing to purchase, was not
seeking to obtain a profit out of the destruction of the premises. As the court
found, the payment by the optionee of interest, taxes, and part of the principal of
the mortgage indicated the intent of the parties that a sale would ultimately be
consummated. Nor does this decision place any hardship upon the optionor, since
all he had bargained for was the contract price of the premises. The solution,
offered in the instant case, of awarding the insurance money on the basis of the
conduct of the parties to the particular litigation, appears to be sounder than a
disposition predicated upon a broad legal generalization.
VALIDITY OF UNATTESTED LEGACY SIGNIFIED IN AUTHENTICATED WILL
A TESTATOR in his will directed his executor to deliver certain sealed envelopes to
the persons whose names appeared thereon. These envelopes had been placed by
the testator in a safe-deposit box to which he alone had access, and bore inscriptions
indicating that the contents were the property of the respective addressees. During
his life the testator retained the income from the bonds which comprised the con-
tents of the two envelopes involved in the probate proceedings. In construing this
clause of the instrument, the court held the attempted gift ineffective because the
envelopes were not signed and attested as required by the Statute of Wills.1
This uncompromising decision is in accord with the orthodox attitude toward the
statutory formalities required in executing a will. However, if it is considered that
10. Peoples Street Ry. Co. v. Spencer, supra note 7, at 91, 27 At. at 114.
11. Kaufman v. All Persons, supra note 7.
12. Williams v. Lilley, supra note 7.
13. Carnation Lumber and Shingle Co. v. Tolt Land Co., supra note 7, at 642, 175 Pac.
at 334.
1. In re Angle's Will, 147 iisc. 445, 264 N. Y. Supp. 29 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
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a primary function of the statute is to provide evidence of testamentary intention
that will decrease the possibility of forged or perjured claims, it would seem that
in the instant case that function is subserved by the presence of an unimpeachable
type of evidence. The testator's use of the safe-deposit box would not appear
to be less efficacious than mere compliance with the statute in rendering the chance
of false claims remote. Rigid insistence upon technicalities thus seems unfortunate
where, as here, the result is to defeat an unequivocally manifested bequest, and
some deviation from a strict interpretation of the statute might well be condoned.
Had the court wished to carry out the indicated disposition, several possibilities
might have suggested themselves. The argument most strenuously advanced was
that the envelopes should be considered a part of the will. The court's refusal
to sanction this position is merely another manifestation of New York's hesitancy
to permit extrinsic documents, testamentary in character but not properly authenti-
cated, to be incorporated into wills by reference.2 But even in those jurisdictions
where a more lenient view prevails,3 under the facts of the instant case the lack of
any clearly expressed intention to make the envelopes part of the will would prob-
ably preclude such a result. 4
Furthermore, it might be contended that this was a valid testamentary gift in
a will sufficiently complete on its face, requiring extrinsic evidence solely for the
purpose of curing ambiguities. If the beneficiary had been named and it were
merely the subject-matter of the gift which required more precise determination,
the court might have upheld the will upon an analogy to those cases which sustain
bequests of the contents of a certain box.5 Here, however, both the beneficiary
and the property must be identified by evidence extrinsic to the will.6 Moreover,
the failure even to describe the beneficiary would be fatal to the argument, especially
since the identifying act cannot meet the requisite test of being significant apart
from the will.
7
As an additional expedient the intended beneficiary might urge that under the
will the executor holds the envelopes in trust for him. Since the bequest to the
alleged trustee is not in absolute terms, this could not be construed as a secret
trust, readily enforceable as a constructive trust.8 It could be supported, if at
2. The New York courts strongly disfavor incorporation by reference. See Booth v.
Baptist Church, 126 N. Y. 215, 247-248, 28 N. E. 238, 242 (1891). But cf. In re Barlow's
Will, 144 Misc. 210, 258 N. Y. Supp. 451 (Surr. Ct. 1932), which regards In re Rausch's
Will, 258 N. Y. 327, 179 N. E. 755 (1932), as rela.xing the New York rule.
3. Within limits, however, most jurisdictions freely permit incorporation by reference.
1 PAGE, WILLs (2d ed. 1926)) § 242 et seq.; Note (1933) 17 Anbne. L. REv. 527.
4. Bottrell v. Spengler, 343 Ill. 476, 175 N. E. 781 (1931); Allenbach v. Ridenour, 51
Nev. 437, 279 Pac. 32 (1929). Cf. O'Leary v. Lane, 149 Ark. 393, 232 S. W. 432 (1921).
5. E. g. Appeal of Magoohan, 117 Pa. 238, 14 Atl. 816 (1887); In re Robson, [1891]
2 Ch. 559.
6. See Evans, Incorporation by Reference, Integration, and Non-testamentary Act (1925)
25 COL. L. REv. 879, for a discussion of the problems involved.
7. Hastings v. Bridge, 166 Atl. 273 (N. H. 1933). It is interesting that New York
holds void a bequest by a testator "to those who will take care of me during my last
illness." In re Wilson's Estate, 143 Misc. 491, 256 N. Y. Supp. 813 (Surr. Ct. 1932).
In such case the identifying act is not performed solely for the purpose of complementing
the will, and practically all courts hold that the uncertainty as to the beneficiary will
not defeat the bequest. Bosserman v. Burton, 137 Va. 502, 120 S. E. 261 (1923), 38
A. L. R. 767 (1925Y.
8. Rudd v. Gates, 191 Ky. 456, 230 S. W. 906 (1921); Winder v. Scholey, 83 Ohio
St. 204, 93 N. E. 1098 (1910); Hollis v. Hollis, 254 Pa. 90, 98 Atl. 789 (1916).
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all, as an express trust. However, most jurisdictions, including New York, hold
that where a will purports to set up an express trust but omits the name of the
beneficiary, the defect cannot be cured by extrinsic evidence.9 It follows that
such a trust would be executory and hence unenforceable. Yet some courts, admit-
ting the evidence in order to prevent a fraud on the intended beneficiary and a
betrayal of the faith upon which the testator relied,' 0 have enforced such gifts
dpon constructive trust principles.11
As a final recourse, the beneficiary might disregard the will and bring a separate
action against the executor on the theory of a consummated inter vivos gift. The
traditional requirement of delivery might seem an insurmountable difficulty, but
several courts have provided an escape. The notations on the envelopes may be
viewed not as words of transfer, but as evidence that all acts necessary to transfer
title had been performed.12 These memoranda may thus be considered declarations
against interest, and admissible against the decedent's estate as an exception to the
hearsay rule of evidence.' 3 However, this is but evidence from which delivery
is inferred, and it may be that other factors would negative a completed gift.14
Yet even the fact that the decedent retained the income until his death would not
prevent the drawing of this inference.15 True, in many jurisdictions there is a
total rejection of the view that delivery may be proved by declarations or admis-
sions that the property belongs to another.' 6 But where, as in the instant case,
the facts work a guarantee against perjured claims, it would seem that the court
should welcome an escape from such an intent-defeating interpretation of the policy
underlying the Statute of Wills.
RECOVERY BY NOTARY PUBLIC OF FEES EARNED DURING EmPLOYMENT BY BANK
PLAINTIFF, a notary public, agreed with the defendant bank to render notarial
services in connection with the protest of negotiable instruments. The bank was
to pay him a monthly salary, and retain whatever fees he might earn. This arrange-
ment continued for twenty-two years, during which the plaintiff received and accepted
the agreed wage in full payment of his services. At no time did he make a claim
or demand for the whole or any part of the notarial fees. Upon terminating his
9. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 224 N. Y. 429, 121 N. E. 61 (1918), noted in (1919) 28
YALE L. J. 411.
10. See Blackwell v. Blackwell, [19291 A. C. 318, 328.
11. Blackwell v. Blackwell, supra note 10; Hughes v. Bent, 118 Ky. 609, 81 S. W.
931 (1904). See Scott, Conveyances Upon Trusts Not Properly Declared (1924) 37 HAiv.
L. REv. 653, 683, n. 85.
12. Govin v. De Miranda, 140 N. Y. 474, 35 N. E. 626 (1893); Miller v. Silverman,
247 N. Y. 447, 160 N. E. 910 (1928); Zollicoffer v. Zollicoffer, 168 N. C. 326, 84 S. E.
349 (1915). See Mechem, Delivery in Gifts of Chattels (1926-1927) 21 IrL. L. R1v. 341,
607, especially cases cited at 608, n. 325.
13. Dean v. Wilkerson, 126 Ind. 338, 26 N. E. 55 (1890); Peacock v. Ambrose, 121
Me. 297, 116 At. 832 (1922); Gallagher v. Brewster, 153 N. Y. 364, 47 N. E. 450 (1897).
Cf. In re Mackintosh's Estate, 140 Misc. 12, 249 N. Y. Supp. 534 (Surr. Ct. 1931).
14. Cf. In re Smith's Will, 132 Misc. 421, 230 N. Y. Supp. 434 (Surr. Ct. 1928).
15. In re Estate of Dayton, 121 Neb. 402, 237 N. W. 303 (1931). See Robinson v.
Pero, 272 Mass. 482, 172 N. E. 599 (1930). Contra: Knox v. El Dorado National Bank,
137 Kan. 500, 21 P. (2d) 353 (1933).
16. Thomas v. Buck, 236 Ky. 241, 32 S. W. (2d) 1006 (1930); cases cited in Mechem,
supra note 12, at 609, n. 326.
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employment with the bank, the notary brought an action I under state law 
2 to
recover the fees for the notarial work he had performed. The court, declaring the
contract between the notary and the bank void as contrary to public policy, held
that the bank must return the full amount of notarial fees received during the last six
years, 3 less the remuneration paid to the notary during that period.
A contract by a public officer to render services gratuitously, or for a compensa-
tion less than that provided by statute, is ordinarily considered invalid as against
public policy.4 An officer so contracting may recover his legal remuneration, despite
his participation in the illegal agreement, since he does not claim through the con-
tract but independently of it, and under statute.0 This policy is based upon the
assumption that the remuneration incident to a public office is essential to the support
of the incumbent, and that to deprive him of it would disturb that vigilance in
office which the expectation of emoluments keeps alive.7 While this function is sub-
served if the rule of non-assignability of official fees is restricted to those which have
not yet been earned, that principle has been indiscriminately applied to cases of
executed agreements as well.
8
The cases that have considered the applicability of this policy to notary publics
have not been in accord. Where a notary has been permitted to recover his fees,
it has been on the ground that there is a public interest prohibiting the assignment
of unearned income,9 which cannot be frustrated by the notary's acquiescence or
past line of conduct.10 The finding that the notary is a public officer is fundamental
to this conclusion. A number of courts, however, have accorded their sanction to
such agreements insofar as they have been executed." This has been accomplished
1. Kip v. People's Bank and Trust Co., 110 N. J. L. 178, 164 At. 253 (1933).
2. N. J. ComnP. STAT. (1910) 3760.
3. It was held that the Statute of Limitations would prevent the recovery of fees
earned outside the six-year period. Supra note 1, at 186, 164 Atl. at 256.
4. Ohio National Bank v. Hopkins, 8 App. D. C. 146 (1896).
5. Bliss v. Lawrence, 58 N. Y. 442 (1874); Ohio National Bank v. Hopkins, supra
note 4.
6. Ohio National Bank v. Hopkins, supra note 4, at 155.
7. Ibid.
8. Ohio National Bank v. Hopkins, supra note 4; Pitsch v. Continental and Commer-
cial Bank, 305 Ill. 265, 137 N. E. 198 (1922); Wood v. Kansas City, 162 Mo. 303, 62
S. W. 433 (1901) ; Geddis v. Westside National Bank, 7 N. J. Misc. 245, 145 Atl. 731 (1929),
aff'd, 106 N. J. L. 238, 148 Atl. 917 (1930). Contra: De Boest v. Gambell, 35 Ore. 368,
58 Pac. 72 (1899); Hobbs v. City of Yonkers, 32 Hun 454 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1884), aff'd,
102 N. Y. 13 (1886). See Dye, Agreement by Public Oflicer to Render Services for Sum
Less than Compensation Fixed by Law as a Valid Agreement when Executed (1921) 92
CENT. L. J. 192, 194.
9. See Ohio National Bank v. Hopkins, supra note 4, at 153. "The policy is obvious
that will forbid such relation to exist, as that created by the agreement ...between a
bank and a notary public, handling the paper affecting the rights of third persons, and
where the incentive might often be strong to suppress or conceal evidence of the negli-
gence of each other ... From the moment that he [notary] receives the paper for notarial
action, he thereby becomes the agent of the owner of the paper, and his paramount duty
is to him, and those affected by his official action."
10. Geddis v. Westside National Bank, supra note 8.
11. Leach v. Hannibal & St. Joseph's Rr. Co., 86 Mo. 27 (1885); Mussing v. The Corn
Exchange National Bank, 173 Ill. App. 53 (1912) (on its facts distinguishable from Pitsch
v. Continental and Commercial Bank, supra note 8); Second National Bank v. Ferguson,
114 Ky. 516, 71 S. W. 429 (1903); McNulty v. Kansas City, 201 Mo. App. 562, 198 S. W.
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largely by invoking an estoppel on the notary's part,12 by adjudging his guilt to be
equal to that of his employer,13 or by considering the executed transaction as an
assignment by the notary of the earned portion of his fees.'
4
While there is no objection to considering a notary a public officer,15 it is ques-
tionable whether he should be amenable to the rule which invalidates an agreement
for the assignment of official fees. The notary's calling is largely transient in nature,
his duties do not appear to be mandatory, the collection of fees is optional, and the
qualifications for the position are of small consequence.' 6 In general, he does not
appear to be a public official requiring the extreme protection accorded him in the
instant case. Since there was ample consideration for the contract in that the notary
received a definite and fixed sum payable to him every month in return for sur-
render of an uncertain amount,17 the court might well have decided that there was
nothing invalid in such an assignment of income.18 In addition, the employer,
acting upon the assumption that its employee had no claim to earned notarial fees,
may have failed to collect some of them, so that to permit a recovery by the notary
would be to throw upon the employer a loss which cannot be recouped.19 It would
seem, therefore, that the public interest can better be subserved by compelling
parties dealing with each other at arm's length to honor their agreements.
POWER OF A STATE TO EXEMPT A SINGLE RAILROAD FROm TAxATION
TEN years of progressively declining revenues brought the Washington, Baltimore,
and Annapolis Electric Railroad into the hands of a receiver. The company was
of strategic importance to the Maryland transportation system; it offered the only
Tail service to the state capitol, and carried millions of passengers annually.' To
facilitate the continued operation of the road, the state legislature exempted from
state and local taxes, for a period of two years, all of the company's property used
for railway purposes.2 The cities of Baltimore and Annapolis challenged the validity
of such limitation upon their taxing power before the federal district court admin-
istering the receivership, contending that the exemption violated both the rule of
uniformity in taxation embodied in the state constitution,3 and the equal protection
185 (1919) (supplanting Wood v. Kansas City, supra note 8, the ordinance in the latter
case having been repealed). See Bryden v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Rr. Co.,
262 Pa. 211, 214, 105 Atl. 79, 80 (1918) (adhering to the Leach case, supra). See also
Jom, AmIcAxur NoTARiEs (Bauer, 4th ed. 1931) § 36.
12. Second National Bank v. Ferguson, supra note 11.
13. Mussing v. The Corn Exchange National Bank, supra note 11.
14. Leach v. The Hannibal & St. Joseph's Rr. Co., supra note 11.
15. See Jomi, op. cit. supra note 11, § 4 and cases cited therein.
16. Id. §§ 8, 37. In New Jersey, he seems to have purely ministerial functions.
17. McNulty v. Kansas City, supra note 11, at 570, 198 S. W. at 188.
18. The arrangement between the parties was not made clear by the court in the
instant case. The court reserved opinion on the power of the officer to waive or remit
a fee after'it has been earned. This seems to imply that the notary was employed by the
bank in a public capacity, and was not doing notarial work incidental to employment
in a private capacity. Cf. Mussing v. The Corn Exchange National Bank, supra note 11.
19. Second National Bank v. Ferguson, supra note 11, at 521, 71 S. W. at 431.
1. The total trackage is only 134.9 miles. Over 3,000,000 passengers are carried annually
(1926-1931). PooR's PuBLIc Urirras (1932) 254.
2. Md. Acts 1931, c. 497.
3. "... . all taxes ... shall be uniform as to land within the taxing district, and uniform
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clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court, affirming the decision
of the district court 4 and reversing the Circuit Court of Appeals, 5 sustained the
validity of the exemption.6
Since a city is merely a creature of the state government, it "has no privileges
or immunities under the Federal Constitution which it may invoke in opposition
to the will of its creator." 7 The Supreme Court, therefore, refused to consider
the contended violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and confined its decision
to the single issue whether the special exemption here challenged conflicted with
the rule of uniformity embodied in the Maryland Constitution.8 But since this
same rule has been read into the Fourteenth Amendment, 9 and exists, expressly or
impliedly, in other state constitutions, 10 cases arising outside of Maryland are directly
in point.
The customary statement of the rule of uniformity is that all persons in similar
circumstances shall be equally and uniformly treated." However, the validity of
reasonable classification, even if it results in unequal taxation, has long been recog-
nized.12 The determination of what constitutes a separable class is said to be
largely a matter of legislative discretion.13 But the criterion of proper discretion
in each case is the attitude of the court before which the validity of the enactment
is challenged. Thus, in one jurisdiction legislative discretion is apparently limited
to classification based upon the extrinsic nature of property. Consequently, build-
ings erected for dwelling purposes during a period of widespread shortage of housing
facilities were held arbitrarily exempted from taxation because all dwelling houses
were not so exempted; 14 and, similarly, the attempted exemption from taxation of
within the class or sub-class of improvements on land and personal property." Maryland
Declaration of Rights, art. 15.
4. Decision not reported.
5. Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 61 F. (2d) 374 (C. C. A. 4th,
1932).
6. Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 289 U. S. 36 (1933).
7. Id. at 40.
8. Other issues were considered, but they are not relevant to the question here discussed.
9. Louisville Gas Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32, 37 (1928); Black v. State, 113 Wis.
205, 219, 89 N. W. 522, 527 (1902).
10. Decisions from states with constitutional enumerations of permitted exemptions
are not in point, for such enumerations are held to exclude other exemptions. Consolidated
Coal Co. v. Miller, 236 Ill. 149, 86 N. E. 205 (1908); Louisiana Cotton Manufacturing
Co. v. New Orleans, 31 La. Ann. 440 (1879); Hogg v. Mackay, 23 Ore. 339, 31 Pac. 779
(1893); Ry. Co. v. Wilson, 89 Tenn. 597, 15 S. W. 446 (1891). Contra: Alpha Tau
Omega v. Douglas County Commissioners, 136 Kan. 675, 18 P. (2d) 573 (1933).
11. Magown v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 293 (1898); Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920); Baltimore v. Starr Church, 106 Md.
281, 288, 67 Atl. 261, 264 (1907); Bernhard Stern and Sons v. Bodden, 165 Wis. 75, 79,
160 N. W. 1077, 1078 (1917).
12. See American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 92 (1900); Baltimore
v. German-American Fire Insurance Co., 132 Md. 380, 386, 387, 103 At. 980, 982, 983
(1918); Bank of Miles City v. Custer County, 93 Mont. 291, 300, 19 P. (2d) 885, 889
(1933); Bernhard Stem and Sons v. Bodden, supra note 11, at 82, 160 N. W. at 1079.
13. See Bell's Gap Rr. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 237 (1890); Florida Central
and Peninsular Rr. Co. v. Reynolds, 183 U. S. 471, 476, 477 (1902); Citizens' Telephone
Co. v. Fuller, 229 U. S. 322, 329, 330, 331 (1913); Lake Superior Mines v. Lord, 271
U. S. 577, 582 (1926); Jackson City v. Mississippi Fire Insurance Co., 132 Miss. 415,
420, 421, 95 So. 845, 848 (1923) ; see also note 12, supra.
14. Koch v. Essex County Board of Taxation, 97 N. J. L. 61, 116 Ati. 328 (1922).
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county lands, when like municipal property was not so favored, was condemned on
the ground that mere ownership and location were made the basis for classification.15
Most courts allow their legislatures greater freedom of discretion.16 Ownership as
a ground for classification has been sanctioned by one court in sustaining the exemp-
tion of mortgages owned by domestic fire insurance companies, 17 and by another
court in upholding an act which relieved from taxation shares of stock in local
corporations when owned by residents of the state.'6 The use made of money and
credit by banks, as distinguished from its use by other institutions, has been held
to justify heavier taxation; '9 the size of telephone companies 20 and the weight
of trucks,2 ' have been sustained as reasonable grounds for exemption; and the
collateral fact that refiners of sugar and molasses were also the producers of what
they refined, has been deemed to justify an exemption of such persons from a gen-
eral tax on refineries.22 Moreover, if the attempt of a legislature to meet a vital
public need has required a certain discrimination in taxation, the rule of uniformity
has not been permitted to thwart it.s Thus, the promotion of manufacturing by
tax exemptions to increase the state wealth 2 4 and the encouragement of domestic
life insurance companies to induce lower insurance rates and larger investments in
state enterprises, 25 have been declared to be within the legislative discretion. Courts
have likewise approved the exemption of small incomes to encourage thrift,2 6 and
of motor vehicles used exclusively in transporting dairy and other farm products.2 7
One court has even ruled that although the tax exemption of a certain utility was
unquestionably contrary to the rule of uniformity, it should not be declared uncon-
stitutional if the legislature, in its proper discretion, thought such special treatment
necessary to promote the public welfare 28
15. Secaucus v. Huber, 87 N. J. L. 464, 95 AUt. 123 (1915).
16. "Any classification is permissible which has a reasonable relation to some permitted
end of governmental action." See Watson v. State Comptroller, 254 U. S. 122, 124 (1920);
Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S. 245, 255 (1922); Bank of Miles City v. Custer
County, supra note 12, at 296, 19 P. (2d) at 887. Differences between property need not
be great to justify classification. See Citizens' Telephone Co. v. Fuller, supra note 13, at
331; Bank of Miles City v. Custer County, supra note 12, at 296, 19 P. (2d) at 887.
The limitation on exemption classification is that exemptions shall not result in "dear and
hostile discriminations against particular persons and classes." See Citizens' Telephone Co.
v. Fuller, supra note 13, at 330, 331; Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., supra at 255; Lake
Superior Mines v. Lord, supra note 13, at 582.
17. Baltimore v. German-American Fire Insurance Co., supra note 12.
18. Travellers' Insurance Co. v. Connecticut, 185 U. S. 364 (1902).
19. Bank of Miles City v. Custer County, supra note 12.
20. Citizens' Telephone Co. v. Fuller, supra note 13.
21. State v. Public Service Commission, 207 Wis. 664, 242 N. W. 668 (1932).
22. American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, supra note 12.
23. See Citizens' Telephone Co. v. Fuller, supra note 13, at 331; Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, supra note 11, at 415; see also note 16, supra.
24. Colton and Moore v. City of Montpelier, 71 Vt. 413, 45 Atl. 1039 (1899). The
vague constitutional provisions on taxation in Vermont embody the rule of uniformity.
In re Hickok's Estate, 78 Vt. 259, 62 Atl. 724 (1906).
25. Miller v. Lamar Life Insurance Co., 158 Miss. 753, 131 So. 282 (1930).
26. In re Opinion of the Justices, 82 N. H. 561, 138 Atl. 284 (1927). Here again
indefinite constitutional provisions have been read to require uniformity in taxation. State
v. Express Co., 60 N. H. 219 (1880).
27. State v. Public Service Commission, supra note 21.
28. Canaan v. District, 74 N. H. 517, 70 AUt. 250 (1908) (see reasoning of Parsons,
There is no apparent reason why the exemption of a single company or enterprise,
as in the instant case, should not also be within the legislature's power of reason-
able classification.2 9  In one case a single water company was held to constitute
a class for exemption purposes upon the ground that although it was similar to other
water companies in most respects, special benefits could be derived from its loca-
tion.30 Charter grants of tax exemptions to individual railroads in order to stimu-
late commerce within the state are familiar examples wherein such narrow classifica-
tion has been judicially sanctioned. 31 And, as said by Mr. Justice Cardozo, speak-
ing for the Court in the principal case, "The policy that sustains an exemption in
order to keep a crippled railroad going is precisely the same as the one that sus-
tains an exemption to set it going at the start." 
3 2
The dangers inherent in this decision are obvious. Legislative liberality in the
form of tax exemptions has been largely responsible for the financial difficulties
which many state and local governments are facing.33 Special exemptions, supple-
menting the traditional, large tax-exempt classes, will impose new burdens upon
those who still must pay and further weaken the credit structures of state and local
governments. The possibilities of legislative favoritism in the awarding of special
privileges to private interests should also be seriously considered. However, if
the exemption in a given case clearly benefits the community, it should not be
invalidated merely because another exemptiot might not be so conducive to the
public welfare.
C. J.). A later decision, while admitting the validity of the ruling, declares the tax
exemption of a certain mill unconstitutional. Eyers Woolen Co. v. Gilsum, 84 N. H. 1,
146 At]. 511 (1929).
29. judicial dicta have often upheld special exemptions. See Tucker v. Ferguson, 89
U. S. 527, 574 (1874); West Wisconsin Ry. Co. v.' Supervisors, 93 U. S. 595, 598 (1876);
Grand Lodge v. New Orleans, 166 U. S. 143, 149 (1897); Canaan v. District, supra note
28, at 547, 548, 70 Atl. at 262, 263; Lawrence University v. Ontagamie County, 150 Wis.
244, 248, 136 N. W. 619, 621 (1912). The exemption of a single brick mill was held
arbitrary in Brewer Brick Co. v. Brewer, 62 Me. 62 (1873) ; as was that of a church wharf
in Baltimore v. Starr Church, supra note 11; a hotel in City of Jackson v. Edwards House,
145 Miss. 135, 110 So. 231 (1926); and a textile mill in Eyers Woolen Co. v. Gilsum,
supra note 28. These cases decided that there existed no public need justifying the
specific narrow classifications; but they do not deny th6 validity of any unit classification.
30. Portland v. Water Co., 67 Me. 135 (1877). For similar reasoning in a non-
exemption case, see Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 96 U. S. 521, 529 (1877).
31. The cases cited in the instant decision, at 41, are typical. It was pointed out that
social policy was the justification for those individual grants, not, as alleged, their con-
tractual nature; for contracts may embody sufficient legal consideration and fail of con-
stitutionality if the tax exemption is contrary to the public interest.
32. Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, supra note 6, at 44.
33. Two excellent articles on the extent of tax exemptions are: Baker, Tax Exemption
Statutes (1928) 7 Tzx. L. Ry. 50; Stimson, Stimulation of Industry Through Tax Exemp-
tion (1933) 11 TAx MAO. 169, 221.
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